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MEDICAL LAW-THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUG
TREATMENT:

SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL GUIDE

MASSACHUSETTs-Rogers v. Commissioner of the Mental
Health Department, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983)
LINES IN

The right of the mentally ill to refuse antipsychotic drug treat
ment) has provoked endless debate between the medical and legal
communities. 2 While common agreement exists that a competent pa
tient has a right to participate in the treatment decisionmaking pro
cess, 3 no agreement exists whether incompetent patients have that
I. Antipsychotic drugs are a psychotherapeutic agent within the category of psycho
tropic drugs and are used to treat psychoses. Baldessarini, Drugs and Treatment ofPsychi
atric Disorders, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 391, (L. Goodman
and A. Gilman eds. 6th ed. 1980). The parties in Rogers focused exclusively on anti
psychotics such as Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolixin and Haldol. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650,
653 n.l (1st Cir. 1980).
Although such medication is useful in controlling various psychoses, it may also exac
erbate psychotic symptoms, cause confusion, stupor or coma, or cause neuromuscular reac
tions resembling Parkinsons disease. The most serious consequence of modem day
psychotropic drug use in mental hospitals is tardive dyskinesia. See Plotkin, Invisible Man
acles: Drugging Mentally Retarded People, 31 STAN. L. R. 637, 638-39 (1979); Plotkin,
Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L.
REV. 461, 485-90 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy]; Guardianship of
Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 438-39, 421 N.E.2d 40,53-54 (1981). Even if a patient's mental illness
is not exacerbated, certain therapies often cause distressing, and occasionally fatal effects.
Id.
Furthermore, antipsychotic drug treatment is often abused in state hospitals. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (use of antipsychotic drugs as
punishment); Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (D. N.J. 1979) (hospital use of
medication as a form of control and as a substitute for treatment); Clites v. State, 322
N.W.2d 917, 921 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (expediency program rather than therapeutic pro
gram). See generally Baldessarini & Lipinski, Risks vs. Benefits ofAntipsychotic Drugs, 289
NEW. ENG. J. MED. 427 (1973) (institutional pressures to reduce the number of hospital
beds or lengths of hospitalization have led to the "sometimes senseless ritualization of drug
therapy" and better use of antipsychotic incorporates them into long term management of
complex psychological and medical problems); Zander, Prolixin Decanoate: Big Brother by
Injection? 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 55, 67-69 (1977) (the abuse of antipsychotic drugs as a
method of control).
2. See generally REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS
VALUES IN CONFLICT (A. Doudera & J. Swazey eds. 1982) (collection of essays prepared
by medical and legal experts on issues involved in the right to refute mental health treat
ment) [hereafter cited as REFUSING TREATMENT].
3. See infra notes 12-46 and accompanying text; See also Bonnie, The Psychiatric
Patient's Right to Refuse Medication: A Survey of the Legal Issues, in REFUSING TREAT
MENT, supra note 2, at 19.
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same right. The disagreement stems from a marked difference in val
ues, ethical principles, and practical considerations. 4 Medical experts
are concerned with their ability to treat a group of individuals who
generally do not possess the competence adequately to decide their
diagnostic futures. 5 The legal community, however, is concerned with
preserving those individuals' right to human autonomy,6 equality,1
and individualism. 8
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court indicated deference to
those legal concerns in its recent decision in Rogers v. Commissioner of
the Department of Mental Health. 9 The supreme judicial court held
that patients who are involuntarily committed to state mental hospi
tals have a right to either accept or refuse treatment by mind-altering
drugs personally, or judicially if they have been adjudicated incompe
tent. JO The ruling assumes significance because it is the first ruling by
the supreme judicial court concerning the use of antipsychotic drugs
on institutionalized patients under state law. I I This note examines the
supreme judicial court's ruling in Rogers. First, it traces the back
4. See Bonnie, supra note 3 at 19-20. See also infra notes 97-105, 116-121 and ac
companying text.
5. Studies show that more than half of all institutionalized patients are incompetent
to give consent, even on such issues as the need for admission. See Contemporary Studies
Project: Facts and Fallacies about Iowa Civil Commitment, 55 IOWA L. REV. 895, 918
(1970); Brief for Petitioners at 54-68, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). In Mills v.
Rogers, counsel for defendants argued before the Supreme Court that allowing patients to
refuse treatment causes vast administrative problems. He stated: "Allowing a patient to
refuse medication will also have an umbrella effect increasing the number of patients rele
gated to warehoused status in our state hospitals. The failure to forcibly medicate an indi
vidual patient refusing medication would affect the entire milieu of a hospital. [Ojne
patient refusing medication frequently set off a sort of contagion of refusal." Id. But see
Okin v. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1369-70 (D. Mass. 1979) (where Judge Tauro made
findings of fact that his temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive order had
not caused any such effect). Cf infra text accompanying note 164.
6. See infra notes 32-45 and accompanying text. See also Ehrlich, Freedom of
Choice: Personal Autonomy and the Right to Privacy, 14 IDAHO L. REV. 447 (1978); Devel
opments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1195
n.12 [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment j.
7. Where the state allows voluntary patients, whether mentally ill or physically ill, to
make their own treatment decisions, but denies the right to involuntarily confined yet com
petent mental patients, no rational distinction exists and a denial of equal protection may
result. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. See authorities cited supra note 6.
9. 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983).
10. Id. at 491, 458 N.E.2d at 310.
11. The Massachusetts court, however, has indirectly discussed this issue in previous
cases. See In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981); Super
intendant of BeIchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
See also Note, Medication and Adjudication: Extending In re Richard Roe III to Institu
tionalized Psychiatric Patients, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1029 (1981).
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ground and history of the right to refuse medical treatment. Next, it
discusses both the substantive rights of involuntarily committed pa
tients and the procedural treatment guidelines as set forth in the Rog
ers decision. Finally, it discusses inherent problems under
Massachusett's present procedure for judicial competency proceedings
and substituted judgment treatment decisions.

II.

HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT

Both the common law and the Constitution provide bases for an
individual's right to refuse medical treatment. The earliest line of de
cisions which addressed this issue cited the common law principle that
individuals are protected from an intentional interference with their
physical being. 12 Our ancestors believed that "[n]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own per
son, free from all restraint or interference of others. . . ."13 Recog
nized as the common law tort of assault and battery,14 the theory
provided one form of legal action against physicians for unauthorized
treatment. 15
Derived from the tort of assault and battery, informed consent
developed as a later basis for refusal of treatment. 16 This doctrine es
poused the basic prinicple that "every human being of adult years and
12. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospitals, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (competent adult has right to determine allowable bodily invasions),
overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N. Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3
(1957); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 575, 137 P. 96, 97 (1913) (an individual's right to
inviolability prevents a physician from interfering with a patient's bodily integrity without
consent). Cf Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S . .11 (1905). In Jacobson the Supreme
Court recognized the right of an individual to assert supremacy of his own wiII in refusing
state mandated vaccinations. The Court, however, noted that "in a well-ordered society
charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual
in respect of his liberty may" be subordinated to society's interest. Id. at 29. See generally
Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy, supra note I, at 485-90 (discussion of the various common law
theories of the right to refuse treatment).
13. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
14. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 10, at 36-37 (4th ed. 1971).
15. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospitals, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E.
92,93 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). The court stated that:
[T]he wrong complained of is not merely negligence. It is trespass. Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.
Id.
16. See PROSSER, supra note 14 at § 18, 101-102; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body."17 In the oft cited decision of Canterbury v. Spence 18 the D.C.
Circuit relied on the concept of informed consent. The case involved
an action against a physician who performed back surgery on a patient
without first informing him of the risk of paralysis. 19 The court stated:
It is the settled rule that therapy not authorized by the patient
may amount to a tort-a common law battery by the physician.
And it is evident that it is normally impossible to obtain consent
worthy of the name unless the physician first elucidates the options
and perils for the patient's edification.20

The application of common law theories to a committed mental
patient's right to refuse treatment, however, has been questioned in the
past. 21 A judicial decision to commit was often interpreted as an im
plicit finding that a person was unable to make treatment decisions. 22
Physicians argued, therefore, that commitment without accompanying
authority to treat would render the act of hospitalization absurd. 23
The force of the argument, however, is diminished by the more recent
recognition that commitment to a mental institution does not auto
matically render patients legally incompetent to exercise their treat
ment rights. 24 The Third Circuit discussed the modern view in Rennie
v. Klein 25 in which mental health patients sued state officials for in
junctive relief from the forcible administration of drugs. The court
reasoned that although a person may be mentally ill and involuntarily
committed to a state hospital, the law still considers that person com
petent to some extent. 26 It stated that commitment limits but does not
17. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Schloendorff
v. Society of N.Y. Hospitals, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, \05 N.E. 92,93 (1914), cert. denied,
409 U.S. \064 (1972).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 783.
21. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Prince v. Sheppard,
307 Minn. 250, 258-59, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (1976) (emphasizing a need for the state to
assume the decision making role regarding the psychiatric treatment for one who is unable
to rationally do so for himself, presumptively based on the fact of commitment on grounds
of mental illness).
22. See Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy, supra note I, at 489. But see, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch.123, § 25 (West Supp. 1983).
23. Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy, supra note I, at 489.
24. See, e.g., Rogers, 390 Mass. 489, 497, 458 N.E.2d 308, 313-14 (1983); Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 658-59 (1st Cir. 1980); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 843 (3d Cir.
1981 ).
25. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
26. Id. at 846.
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extinguish an individual's right to be free from confinement and per
sonal intrusion.27 Thus, absent a compelling interest to treat, an invol
untarily committed mental patient retains a common law right of
action for non-consensual treatment by a private physician. 28
In addition to common law origins, constitutional principles such
as the right to privacy,29 freedom of thought,30 and protection from
cruel and unusual punishment 3! also support the right to refuse treat
ment. The much publicized decision in In re Quinlan 32 first extended
the constitutional right to privacy to include the right to refuse medi
cal treatment. The New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the parents of
a comatose patient to withdraw her from a mechanical respirator
thereby asserting their daughter's right of privacy.33 Since that deci
sion a number of other courts have recognized the privacy right to
27. Id.
28. Case Comment, The Forcible Medication of Involuntarily Committed Mental Pa
tients with Antipsychotic Drugs-Rogers v. Okin, 15 GA. L. REV. 739, 756 (1980) [hereinaf
ter cited as Case Comments, Forcible Medication]. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 947
(3d Cir. 1976) (patient had a right to refuse Thorazine and, absent an emergency, uncon
sented to medical treatment is a tort); Stowers v. Ardmore Acres Hosp., 19 Mich. App.
115, 122, 172 N.W.2d 497, 500-01 (1969) (person not adjudged mentally incompetent
before commitment had action for assault and battery against treating physician who forci
bly injected plaintiff with medication), affd sub nom., Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich.
119, 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971).
29. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Ehrlich, supra note 6; see also notes
32-37 and accompanying text. The right to due process is used as another constitutional
basis for the mentally ill to refuse treatment. See Note, Civil Rights-A Mental Patient's
Right Needing Protection, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 406, 412 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Civil Rights]. See also Rennie, 653 F.2d at 841 n.6 (distinction between refusing
treatment on due process grounds or privacy grounds is illusory).
30. The idea, based on the first amendment right to freedom of expression, was rec
ognized in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969). See infra notes 38-45 and accom
panying text. See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (". . . in a
free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than
coerced by the State").
31. The eighth amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. See generally Symonds, Mental Pa
tients'Right to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Medication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7
HAST!NGS CONST. L.Q. 701 (1980) (author discusses the merits of using the eighth amend
ment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as an argument against forced
medication of committed patients). The Supreme Court of the United States recognized
that forced medication may be a condition of confinement to a mental hospital, requiring
due process is necessary before a prisoner is transferred from a jail to a hospital. Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 (1980).
32. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
33. Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671. The court did raise the competency issue when it
noted that under ordinary circumstances the patients right of choice would be based upon
her competency to assert it. Id.
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refuse medical treatment. 34 Lower court decisions have suggested that
involuntarily committed mental patients could assert the same right
absent a compelling state interest;35 the Supreme Court of the United
States, however, has declined to consider the issue. 36
The first amendment right to freedom of expression provides yet
another constitutional basis for the right to refuse medical treatment. 37
In the past, patients who sought to refuse medical treatment on reli
gious grounds relied on this argument. 38 More recently, however, it
has supported the argument that individuals have the right to be free
from involuntary mind control. 39 Advocates of this position reason
that since the first amendment protects the expression of ideas and
thoughts, it must be extended to protect an individual's right to gener
ate those ideas and thoughts. 40 Courts have accepted this reasoning in
cases which involve the right of involuntarily committed patients to
refuse mental health treatment.41
The eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
34. See, e.g., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (competent pa·
tient at state mental institution allowed to refuse drug treatment absent danger to himself
or others in the institution); Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (terminally ill patient was allowed to refuse chemother·
apy); In re Quakenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978) (a competent adult may
refuse a leg amputation).
35. See, e.g., Okin v. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360·71 (D. Mass. 1979). See also
Civil Commitment, supra note 6, at 1194; Note, Mental Health-The Right to Refuse Drug
Therapy Under "Emergency Restraining Statutes", 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 509, 535 (1976).
36. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 304·05 (1982).
37. This right to freedom of expression includes both the right of an individual to
communicate and the action or process of thinking. See Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy, supra
note I, at 494; Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.·C.L. L.
REV. 363, 388·96 (1980).
38. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 69·70 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
985 (1971); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
39. See Okin v. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979); Kaimowitz v.
Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, No. 73·19434 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973), reprinted in A.
BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902, 916·20 (1974)
(court accepted this theory in a case in which a state hospital wanted to submit a mental
patient to experimental psychosurgery). Cj. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143·44
(D.N.J. 1978) (held that if forced medication is appropriate, the temporary dulling of the
senses accompanying the medication does not violate the first amendment).
40. Note, Civil Rights, supra note 29 at 411; See Plotkin, Therapeutic Orgy, supra
note I, at 494·95.
41. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143·44 (D.N.J. 1978). The parties
in Rogers raised the issue in the U.S. District Court. Okin v. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342,
1367 (D. Mass. 1979). The court held that the first amendment right to free expression and
thought does include the mental patient's right to be free from involuntary mind control.
[d. Neither the appellate court, Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 654 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980), nor
the United States Supreme Court, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 303·06 (1982), however,
reached this issue on appeal or certiorari.
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punishment42 is less frequently cited than first amendment freedom of
expression and privacy rights as a basis for refusing medical treatment.
The difficulty in relating it to individuals' rights to refuse treatment
arises from its normal application in penal rather than medical con
texts.43 The Court discussed the principle, however, in Knecht v. Gill
man 44 which involved the behavioral medical treatment of prison
inmates. The Eighth Circuit held that forcible administration of a
pormorphine to induce prolonged and violent vomiting constituted
cruel and unusual punishment if used as treatment of inmates' behav
ioral problems. 45 The applicability of this particular constitutional ar
gument to involuntarily committed mental patients remains somewhat
limited since officials rarely characterize their treatment as
"punishment."46
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF ROGERS

Rogers originated in 1975 in the United States District Court in

Massachusetts as a class action against the Commissioner of the De
partment of Mental Health, numerous doctors, and administrative
staff members at the May and Austin Units of Boston State Hospital. 47
The plaintiffs, both voluntary and involuntary patients at the Boston
Hospital, challenged the constitutionality of forced medication and in
voluntary seclusion of patients in non-emergency circumstances. 48
The District Court denied damages49 but granted injunctive relief
based on its determination that mental patients not adjudicated incom
petent possess a constitutional right to refuse freatment in non-emer
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See supra note 31 for tellt of this amendment.
43. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (use of strap as
disciplinary measure in state penitentiary violates eighth amendment guarantee against
cruel and unusual punishment); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967)
(eighth amendment forbids confining prisoner in bitter cold and depriving him of basic
elements of hygiene).
44. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
45. Id. at 1140.
46. See Case Comments, Forcible Medication, supra note 28 at 744-45. Contra Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980); see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
47. Okin v. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1352 (D. Mass. 1979). The plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 1352.
48. Id. The plaintiffs' arguments focused on their constitutional right to refuse treat
ment. They conceded, however, that their right is not absolute but rather one which is
subordinate to the hospital's right to provide emergency care when the safety of the individ
ual patient, or other patients, is threatened.
49. Id. at 1375-89. The court made various findings of fact and conclusions of law
concerning the defendants' treatment and seclusion practices. It determined that on the
basis of the evidence submitted, the plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants' treatment and
seclusion practices were not in accordance with acceptable medical standards. Id. at 1389.
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gency situations. 50 Further, it held that in the event of an adjudication
of incompetence, patients' guardians could exercise any rights to make
treatment decisions which the patient possessed. 51
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the denial of damages,52 but
vacated and remanded the issue of injunctive relief. 53 The court indi
cated that physicians could use their discretion in deciding to adminis
ter drugs forcibly, but only after balancing the interests of the patients
against the State's interest in preventing violence within the institu
tion. 54 Furthermore, the court expanded the definition of an "emer
gency" situation in which patients could be treated against their Will,55
and held that state officials need not seek a guardian's approval for
individual treatment decisions. 56 Thus, the appellate court decision
allowed physicians greater latitude in treatment decisions than did the
District Court; it retained, however, the requirement of a judicial de
termination of incapacity to decide treatment decisions in non-emer
gency situations. 57
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether an involuntarily committed mental patient possesses a consti
tutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. 58 The
Supreme Court, however, refused to rule on the constitutional issue.
Rather, it vacated and remanded the case to the circuit court for a
50. Id. at 1365-67. The judge enjoined the defendants from forcibly medicating pa
tients except in an "emergency" which the judge defined as "circumstances in which a
failure [to treat] . . . would bring about a substantial likelihood of physical harm to the
patients or others". Id. at 1371.
51. Id. at 1364.
52. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs appealed the
denial of damages by the District Court and the defendants questioned the parameters of
the injunctive relief in a cross-appeal.
53. Id. at 653. Judge Coffin stated that the circuit court was in "substantial agree
ment with portions of the district court's reasoning" but it was necessary to modify several
important aspects of the lower court's ruling. Id.
54. Id. at 656-57. The court stated that the District Court's "substantial likelihood
of physical harm" standard was too narrow. Id. at 659-60.
55. Id. "Emergency" included those situations in which an incompetent patient's
health would significantly deteriorate without medication. Id. The court gave no gui
dance, however, on what this standard meant or how it could be applied.
56. Id. at 661.
57. Id.
58. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 293 (1982). Defendants petitioned the Supreme
Court to review the First Circuit ruling that involuntarily committed patients may refuse
antipsychotic drug treatment. Defendants stressed two basic reasons why the court should
not recognize such a right. First, the right of refusal would impair the state's interest in
maintaining order and treating other patients. Brief for Petitioners at 54-68, Mills v. Rog
ers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). Second, the original commitment decision would act as a suffi
cient predicate for administering drug treatment. Id.
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determination of committed patients' rights, both substantively and
procedurally, under Massachusetts law. 59 On remand, the First Cir
cuit court certified nine questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. 60

III.

THE ROGERS V. COMMISSIONER DECISION

The supreme judicial court's decision in Rogers extended the right
to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs to institutionalized pa
tients in Massachusetts. 61 Although the supreme judicial court previ
ously speculated on that right in Guardianship of Roe,62 Rogers is the
first ruling on the issue under Massachusetts common and statutory
law. 63 The unanimous opinion, written by Justice Abrams, divided
the nine certified questions into four groups. Discussion follows which
addresses each of those groups individually.
A.

Competence of Involuntarily Committed Patients to Make
Treatment Decisions; Judicial Determination of
Incompetence 64

The supreme judicial court concluded in Rogers that, except in an
59. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 305-06 (1981). The court stated that in theory it
could "define the scope of a patient's federally protected liberty interest without reference
to state law." It indicated, however, that the "substantive rights provided by the Federal
Constitution define only a minimum." Id. at 300 (emphasis added). Further, the court
stated that the state law recognize liberty interests which are more extensive than federal
rights. Id. The court decided, therefore, to remand the case to the circuit court for a
determination of the plaintiffs' rights under state law. Id. at 306.
The Supreme Court's decision to remand was also influenced by the supreme judicial
court's decision in Roe which was decided whiie the Mills case (see supra note 58) was
before the Supreme Court. On remand, the circuit court was to determine how Roe may
have changed or defined Massachusetts law and whether that decision required a revision
of its decision or certification of dispositive state-law questions to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. Id.
60. Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. at 494, 458 N.E.2d at 312.
61. Id. at 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983).
62. 383 Mass. 415, 441-42, 421 N.E.2d 4055 (1981).
63. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 494 n.7, 458 N.E.2d at 312 n.7. The court indicated that
since the Supreme Court's opinion was predicated on the decision in Roe, the answers to
the certified questions were controlled under statutory and common law and thus the court
did not discuss the issues under the state constitution. Id.
64. Id. at 494, 458 N.E.2d at 312. This section of the opinion addressed the first
three certified questions concerning "Non-Emergency Situations":
I. Under state law, does the civil involuntary commitment of a person to a
mental institution constitute a determination of incompetency to make treatment
decisions?
2. If not, does state law, in the absence of an emergency justifying exercise
of the state's police power or an imminent threat to a patient's condition
justifying exercise of the state's parens patriae power, require a probate court
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"emergency,"65 a judicial adjudication of incompetence to make treat
ment decisions must precede any determination to override patient's
rights to make their own treatment decisions. 66 The court clearly indi
cated that committment to a mental institution under Massachusetts
law does not indicate incompetence to make treatment decisions. 67
The court noted that Massachusetts statutes instead "comprehend"
the competence of an involuntarily committed patient to make treat
ment decisions. 68
The court derived its conclusions from various sections of Massa
chusetts General Laws Annotated chapter 123 69 and from previous
case law. 70 Section twenty-five of chapter 123 states that an individual
is not deemed incompetent to manage his own affairs solely by reason
of admission or commitment to a mental health facility.71 The court
noted that two factors control civil commitment in Massachusetts:
1) a finding of mental illness; and 2) a showing that failure to commit
the person would create a likelihood of serious harm.72 The court infinding of incompetence and appointment of a guardian as the exclusive method
for determining incompetency to make treatment decisions?
3. If, in the circumstances described in question no. 2, probate proceedings
are not the exclusive method for determining incompetency to make treatment
decisions, what other procedure or procedures may be sufficient under state law?
Id. at 494 & n.8, 458 N.E.2d at 312 & n.8.
65. The court defined emergencies as situations in which "a patient poses an immi
nent threat of harm to himself or others," and only if there is no less intrusive alternatives
to antipsychotic drugs. Id. at 510-11,458 N.E.2d at 321-22.
66. Id. at 498, 458 N.E.2d at 314. See, e.g., Rennie, 653 F.2d at 846; Winters v.
Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
67. Id. at 497, 458 N.E.2d at 314. See Roe, 383 Mass. at 442 & n.15, 421 N.E.2d at
55 & n.15 ("a person is presumed to be competent unless shown by the evidence not to be
competent," even while committed to a public or private institution); Boyd v. Registrars of
Voters of Belchertown, 368 Mass. 631, 635-36, 334 N.E.2d 629, 632 (1975) (residence at
Belchertown State School does not itself render person incompetent).
68. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 496, 458 N.E.2d at 313.
69. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, §§ 1,7,8,25 (West Supp. 1983).
70. See, e.g., Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555,432 N.E.2d 712 (1982); Roe, 383 Mass.
415,421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
71. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § 25.
No person shall be deemed to be incompetent to manage his own affairs, to
contract, to hold professional or occupational or vehicle operators licenses or to
make a will solely by reason of his admission or commitment in any capacity to
the treatment or care of the department or to any public or private facility, nor
shall departmental regulations restrict such rights.
Id.
72. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 495, 458 N.E.2d at 312. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch.123, § 7(a) (West Supp. 1983) which states: "The superintendent of a facility may peti
tion the district court . . . for the commitment . . . of any patient at said facility whom
said superintendent determines that the failure to hospitalize would create a likelihood of
serious harm by reason of mental illness." Id. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123,
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terpreted the factors as requiring "no adjudication of judgmental ca
pacity." The court concluded, therefore, that no requirement exists
that a person be incompetent in order to be committed. 73
Given that one statutory definition specifically includes "judg
ment" as a criteria for a finding of "likelihood of serious harm,"74 the
court interpreted the two factors liberally.
The definitions of
"[l]ikelihood of serious harm" in section one of chapter 123 include a
"very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury to the person
himself as manifested by evidence that such person's judgment is so
affected that he is unable to protect himself in the community."75 The
court dismissed the relevance of this definition by stating that "[it]
says nothing concerning . . . competence to make treatment
decisions. "76
In addition to considering the sections of Chapter 123 which ad
dress the criteria for civil commitment, the court examined those sec
tions which relate to patients' rights to manage their own affairs. 77
This right exists for patients under the present statutory scheme. 78 It
encompasses the right to make basic decisions concerning personal
care and maintenance of physical and mental health. 79 The court in
Rogers concluded, therefore, that the right to make specific treatment
§ 8(a) (West Supp. 1983) which states "[a]fter a hearing . . . the district court shall not
order the commitment of a person at a facility . . . unless it finds after a hearing that
(I) such person is mentally ill, and (2) the discharge of such person from a facility would
create a likelihood of serious harm." Id.
73. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 495, 458 N.E.2d at 313.
74. Section I, the definitional section of Chapter 123, lists three different definitions
for "likelihood of serious harm";
(I) [A] substantial risk of physical harm to the person himself as manifested by
evidence of threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious bodily harm; (2) a sub
stantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by evidence of homi
cidal or other violent behavior or evidence that others are placed in reasonable
fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them; or (3) a very substan
tial risk of physical impairment or injury to the person himself as manifested by
evidence that such person's judgment is so affected that he is unable to protect
himself in the community and that reasonable provision for his protection is not
available in the community.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § I (West Supp. 1983).
The court summarily dismissed the first two definitions as "provid(ing) no adjudica
tion of judgmental capacity." Rogers, 390 Mass. at 495, 458 N.E.2d at 313 (quoting Rogers
v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 658). The court stated that commitment under these two definitions
"is based on a determination of risk of physical harm to the individual or to others." Id.
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § I (West Supp. 1983).
76. Rogers, at 495, 458 N.E.2d at 313.
77. Id. at 494-96,458 N.E.2d at 312-14.
78. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § 25 (West Supp. 1983).
79. Fazio v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 394,403,378 N.E.2d 951, 957 (1978).
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decisions derives from the patients' right to manage their affairs. 80
Only after a judge, through an incompetency proceeding,81 finds pa
tients incapable of taking care of themselves by reason of mental ill
ness do these decisions become the responsibility of an appointed
guardian, rather than the patients. 82
The court proceeded to reject defendant's argument that doctors
should make treatment decisions for involuntarily committed patients,
whether competent or not. 83 It had previously held in Harnish v. Chil
dren's Hospital Medical Center 84 "that every competent adult has a
right to forego treatment, or even cure, if it entails what for him are
intolerable consequences or risks despite the views of the medical pro
fession."85 Accordingly, since involuntarily committed patients are
presumed competent, until adjudicated otherwise, both case law and
statutory law dictate that they possess the right to refuse treatment. 86

B.

The Decision to Treat Incompetent Mental Patients with
Antipsychotic Drugs 87

The court began its discussion of the use of antipsychotic drugs
on incompetent mental patients with the premise that a general right
exists to refuse medical treatment in appropriate circumstances. 88 The
court stated that "the recognition of that right must extend to the
cases of an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Rogers, at 496, 458 N.E.2d at 313.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.201, § 6 (West Supp. 1983).
Rogers, at 497, 458 N.E.2d at 314.
Id.
387 Mass. 152, 154,439 N.E.2d 240, 242 (1982).
85. Id. (quoting Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.l. 606, 624, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (1972».
86. Rogers, at 498, 458 N.E.2d at 314.
87. The section addressed certified questions 4 and 5 concerning "Non-emergency
Situations":
4. If a proper determination of incompetency to make treatment decisions has
been made, and in the absence of an emergency justifying exercise of the state's
police power or an imminent threat to a patient's condition justifying exercise of
the state's parens patriae power, under state law must there be a substituted
judgment decision, or other decision by a person aside from the incompetent,
prior to the administration of psychotropic drugs?
5. If so, who may make such a decision, what procedures must be followed,
and what factors must be considered?
Id. at 499 n.13, 458 N.E.2d at 315 n.l3.
88. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 499, 458 N.E.2d at 315. See supra notes 1246 and accom·
panying text. See also Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728,745·46,370 N.E.2d 417, 427·28 (1977); Gaughan and LaRue, The Right ofa Mental
Patient to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, 4 LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY REV. 43,
74 (1978).
'
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value of human dignity extends to both."89 The court concluded,
therefore, that if an involuntarily committed patient refuses anti
psychotic drug treatment and is subsequently adjudicated incompe
tent, those charged with his or her protection must seek a judicial
substituted judgment decision. 9o
Under the substituted judgment standard, the guardian or doc
tors for incompetent involuntarily committed patients must petition
the court for a substitute judgement by a judge concerning the treat
ment decision. 91 The judge must determine "with as much accuracy
as possible" the wants and needs of the individuals involved.92 As the
court in Rogers indicated, the decision should be that which would
have been made by the individual patients, if they had been
competent. 93
The use of this standard in Rogers extended the supreme judicial
court's decision in Matter ofMoe 94 which involved the issue of sterili
zation. In Moe, the court held that guardians must acquire prior judi
cial approval before they may consent to or refuse proposed
"extraordinary" medical treatment. 95 Since psychotropic drug treat
ment was characterized as extraordinary at the time, the court in Rog
ers mandated court approval before forcible medication of an
incompetent patient in nonemergency situations. 96
The supreme judicial court, moreover, rejected use of the "medi
cal model" approach to a substituted judgment. 97 Under the proce
dure, a qualified physician rather than a judge would make the
89. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 499-500, 458 N.E.2d at 315 (quoting Superintendant of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745-46, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427-28
(1977».
90. Id. at 501-02, 458 N.E.2d at 316. The court indicated in a footnote that its deci
sion focused on patients who refuse treatment, because the issue generally arises in that
context. Id. at 500 n.14, 458 N.E.2d at 315 n.14. Further, the court noted that because
incompetent patients cannot meaningfully consent, a substituted judgment should be un
dertaken for them even if they accept the medical treatment. Id.
91. See Roe, 383 Mass. at 434-35, 421 N.E.2d at 51-52.
92. Id. See Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
750,370 N.E.2d 417, 430 (1977).
93. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 500, 458 N.E.2d at 316.
94. 385 Mass. 555, 559, 432 N.E.2d 712, 716 (1982). See also Matter of Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 639, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (1980); Superintendant of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 750-51, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31 (1977); Guardianship of Basset,
7 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 61, 385 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (1979); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct.
377, 385, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (1978).
95. Moe, 385 Mass. at 559, 432 N.E.2d at 712; See Roe, 383 Mass. at 436-40, 421
N.E.2d at 51-55 (court discusses why psychotropic drugs are considered "extraordinary"
treatment).
96. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 501-02, 458 N.E.2d at 316.
97. Id. at 502, 458 N.E.2d at 317.
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substituted judgment. 98 The American Psychiatric Association, which
filed an amicus curae brief in the case, claimed that the "medical
model" would protect incompetent patients' civil rights to refuse treat
ment, while providing the hospital with a qualified medical opinion as
the basis for the substituted judgment. 99 Further, the Association ar
gued that the "medical model" would provide flexibility in hospital
administration and avoid the adversarial quality of judicial
proceedings. 100
The court disagreed with these arguments. 101 It stated that "no
medical expertise is required [for making the substituted judgment de
cision], although medical advice and opinion is to be used for the same
purposes and sought to the same extent that the individual would, if
he were competent."102 The court cited inherent conflicts of interest
as another argument against use of the medical model. 103 It reasoned
that doctors must maintain order in the hospital as well as treat pa
tients, and therefore have interests in conflict with their patients who
wish to avoid medication. l04 A number of courts and commentators
have voiced these same concerns. !Os
Once the supreme judicial court in Rogers mandated a judicial
substituted judgment for incompetent institutionalized patients who
have refused treatment, it enumerated six factors to be considered by
the judge in arriving at the substituted judgment: 106 the patients' ex
pressed preferences regarding treatment; 107 the extent of the patients'
98.
99.

Id. But see Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 35, 355 A.2d 647, 661 (1976).
Rogers, 390 Mass. at 502, 458 N.E.2d at 317.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Roe, 383 Mass. at 435, 421 N.E.2d at 52).
103. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 503, 458 N.E.2d at 317. The court in Roe listed "likeli
hood of conflicts" as one of five factors to be considered in determining the necessity a
judicial substituted judgment decision. The other factors included: (I) the intrusiveness of
the proposed treatment, (2) the possibility of adverse side effects, (3) the absence of emer
gency, (4) and the nature and extent of prior judicial involvement. Roe, 383 Mass. at 436,
421 N.E.2d at 52. The court did not address all these factors in its opinion in Rogers. For
a more detailed discussion, see Roe, 383 Mass. at 436-43, 421 N.E.2d at 52-58.
104. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 503 & n.19, 458 N.E.2d at 317-18 & n.19.
105. See supra text accompanying note I.
106. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 505-7, 458 N.E.2d at 318-19.
107. Id. at 505, 458 N.E.2d at 318 (quoting Roe, 383 Mass. at 444-45, 421 N.E.2d at
57). This factor is ironic given that the substituted judgment decision usually takes place
after patients have refused treatment. As the court noted, however, patients may have
expressed their preferences before being adjudicated incompetent. Id. If made while com
petent, such a preference receives great weight unless evidence indicates that the patients
would have changed their opinions under normal circumstances. Id. Further, even if the
patients state the preference while incompetent, it is treated as a "critical factor in the
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religious convictions; 108 the impact of the decision on the patients'
family; 109 the probability of adverse side effects; lID the prognosis with
out treatment; III and the prognosis with treatment. 112 If the judge
orders treatment after considering these factors, he or she should then
authorize a treatment plan 113 which is subject to periodic review by
the court. I 14
C.

"Police Power" and the Use of Antipsychotic Drugs I 15
The third portion of the court's opinion weighed the institutional

determination of (their) best interests." Id. (quoting Doe v. Doe, 377 Mass. 272, 277-79,
385 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (1979».
108. Id. The court considers patients' religious beliefs "to the extent. . . they may
contribute to . . . [the] refusal of treatment." Id. As the supreme judicial court stated
"[t]he question to be addressed is whether certain tenets or practices of the incompetent's
faith would cause him individually to reject the specific course of treatment proposed for
him in his present circumstances . . . ." Id. See also cases cited supra note 38.
109. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 505-6, 458 N.E.2d at 319. This factor takes into account
the burdens of cost and time on the patient's family for home care or institutional care.
The focus of this inquiry, however, remains on what the patient would choose if competent.
Id.
110. Id. at 506, 458 N.E.2d at 319. This entails an analysis of the "severity of these
side effects, the probability that they would occur, and the circumstances in which they
would be endured." Id. (quoting Roe, 383 Mass. at 447, 421 N.E.2d at 58). See supra note
1 for a description of the adverse effects of antipsychotic drugs. See also Note, A Common
Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the Institutionalized Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1720, 1726-27 (1982); Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medi
cation, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & LAW 179, 183 (1980).
Ill. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 506, 458 N.E.2d at 319 (quoting Roe, 383 Mass. at 447-48,
421 N.E.2d at 58-59). The court noted that probably most patients would wish to avoid a
steadily worsening condition. The court stipulated, however, that the judge must reach an
individualized conclusion based on the unique "perspective of the incompetent person."
Id.
112. Id. The likelihood of improvement or cure would most likely influence patients'
treatment decisions. Id.
113. Id. at 506-07,458 N.E.2d at 319. The court noted that the treatment plan
should include various specifically identified medications which would be administered
over a long period of time. Id.
114. Id. The review is needed so that the court can determine whether the condition
of the patient has substantially changed. Id. at 507,458 N.E.2d at 319. Once the court
order has issued, the burden shifts to the incompetent patient's guardian to seek modifica
tion of the order. Id.
115. The section addressed certified questions 6 and 7:
Non-emergency Situations
6. Under state law, after a proper decision to refuse medication has been made,
what state interest or interests would be sufficiently compelling to overcome the
interest of the individual in refusing treatment with antipsychotic drugs?
Emergency Situations
7. What standards and procedures are required under state law to make a
decision forcibly to medicate involuntarily committed patient under the state's
police power?
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concerns of the defendants against the plaintiffs' right of self-determi
nation. Defendants argued that the limitation of their ability to medi
cate creates unfortunate side effects: "hospital administration becomes
more difficult, lengths of stay increase, fewer patients are treated, staff
turnover increases, and new personnel become more difficult to at
tract."116 The court indicated, however, that the patients' rights to
make treatment decisions 117 and to be free from the potential abuse of
medication for administrative convenience I 18 outweighed the listed in
stitutional considerations.
The court did recognize that hospitals must protect third persons
as well as the patients themselves while preserving security within the
institution. 119 It noted, however, that administering drugs for these
reasons necessitates strict compliance with the statutory and regula
tory conditions for use of chemical restraints. 120 These conditions per
mit restraint of mental health patients only in cases of emergency such
as extreme violence, personal injury, or attempted suicide, or the seri
ous threat of any of the foregoing. 121
The court made very clear that neither hospital physicians nor
the courts could vary these standards. 122 Only if patients pose an im
minent threat of harm to themselves or others and only if no less intru
sive alternative exists may the Commonwealth invoke its police
powers without prior court approval to treat patients by forcible medi
cation of antipsychotic drugs. 123
Id. at 507 n.23, 458 N.E.2d at 319-20 n.23.
116. Id. at 507,458 N.E.2d at 319-20.
117. Id. at 507,458 N.E.2d at 320. See Superintendant of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,741-45,370 N.E.2d 417, 426-27 (1977); Contra Commissioner
of Corrections v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255,266,399 N.E.2d 452, 459 (1979) (prisoner's refusal
of kidney dialysis may be subordinated to need to operate prison in orderly manner).
118. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 508, 458 N.E.2d at 520. The court listed numerous law
review articles and cases which detail the abuse of antipsychotic drugs for administrative
convenience, punishment, and restraint. Id. at 508-09, 458 N.E.2d at 320-321. See also
supra text accompanying note 1.
119. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 509, 458 N.E.2d at 321.
120. Id. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § 21 (West Supp. 1984). See also 104
MASS. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 104, § 3.12 (2) (1978). "Restraint or seclusion of patients may be
used only in emergency situations where there is the occurrence or serious threat of ex
treme violence, personal injury, or attempted suicide." Further, those regulations define
"restraint" to include mechanical, chemical, and therapeutic restraints. Id. § 3.12 (3).
121. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.123, § 21 (West Supp. 1984). The court indicated
in a footnote to its decision that it adhered to the definition of emergency as stated in Roe:
"unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate
action." Rogers, 390 Mass. at 509 n.25, 458 N.E.2d at 321 n.25 (quoting Roe, 383 Mass. at
440,421 N.E.2d at 40).
122. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 510-11, 458 N.E.2d at 321-22.
123. Id. (emphasis added). Cf Bonnie, supra note 3, at 24 (author argues that the
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Forcible Antipsychotic Medication Essential to Prevent
"Immediate, Substantial, and Irreversible Deterioration of
a Serious Mental Illness" 124

The supreme judicial court reiterated in Rogers its rejection of the
use of the commonwealth's parens patriae power 125 "to do what is
'best' for citizens despite their own wishes."126 The substituted judg
ment standard remains the norm in Massachusetts. 127 In Guardian
ship of Roe, the court outlined the rare circumstances in which
Massachusetts may invoke its parens patriae power and override pa
tients' refusals of medication absent the threat of violence. 128 It stated
that noninstitutionalized patients may be treated against their will to
prevent the "immediate, substantial and irreversible deterioration of a
serious mental illness."129
The Rogers ruling extended this standard to include the institu
tionalized patient. The court stressed, however, that only "interim
treatment" is allowed under such situations. 13o After patients are
medicated to avoid immediate deterioration, if doctors wish to con
tinue such medication, they must first acquire judicial adjudications of
the patients' incompetence. 131 Such adjudication can be conducted
through an expedited hearing process provided by Massachusetts
law.132 If the judge determines that the involuntarily committed paemergency exception actually represents an end-run around both the police power ideology
and self-determination principles).
124. The final two certified questions the court addressed were as follows:
Emergency Situations
8. Under state law is there a parens patriae state interest in situations where the
delay that would be occasioned by ordinary recourse to the properly designated
decision maker could cause a serious deterioration of the patient?
9. If so, under state law, what procedures must be followed and what standard
of decisionmaking must be applied to those situations?
Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511 n.27, 458 N.E.2d at 322 n.27.
125. "Parens patriae originates from the English common law where the King had a
royal prerogative to act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities." Although limited by
recent laws and court decisions, the parens patriae power in the United States belongs with
the states. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
126. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511,458 N.E.2d at 322. The court relied on its decision in
Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40, in which it indicated that the state's
"interest in requiring its residents to function at their maximum capacity" does not out
weigh the fundamental individual rights asserted therein. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511, 458
N.E.2d at 322.
127. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511, 458 N.E.2d at 322.
128. Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. at 448-49, 421 N.E.2d at 59.
129. Id. at 441, 421 N.E.2d at 55.
130. Rogerli, 390 Mass. at 512, 458 N.E.2d at 322.
131. Id.
132. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.20l, §§ 7, 14 (West 1958); MASS. P. Cr. R. 29.
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tients are incompetent, he or she must then make a substituted judg
ment concerning treatment. 133
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The supreme judicial court's decision reflects the general recogni
tion that mental illness does not automatically render individuals inca
pable of rational decisionmaking. 134 Psychiatric literature has
documented many forms of mental illness which impact specifically on
affected individuals, leaving decision making capacities and reasoning
abilities unimpaired. 135 Under the Rogers decision, Massachusetts
physicians must respect those abilities and allow patients to manage
their personal affairs. 136 Physicians may disregard the rule only in
emergency situations or when a judge in an incompetency hearing ad
judicates patients as incompetent. \37 If patients are determined in
competent, the court must then make a substituted judgment
treatment decision. 138 Thus, the judiciary is called upon not only to
determine what constitutes "competency" in terms of treatment deci
sions but also to ascertain what treatment decision incompetent pa
tients would have made, if competent.
It is a difficult task at best to determine whether individuals are
competent given that no real clinical, medical, or psychiatric criteria
exist for determining competence. 139 Factors cited as appropriate to
the finding include: the patients' knowledge that they have choices to
make; their abilities to understand the available options; their cogni
133. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 512, 458 N.E.2d at 322.
134. Id. at 496-98, 458 N.E.2d at 313-14. See Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 442, 421 N.E.2d
40, 55 (a person is presumed competent even though committed to a public or private
institution).
135. See, e.g., J. PAGE, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF UNDERSTANDING
DEVIANCE 32-35 (1971). The Federal District Court in Rogers stated that the weight of
evidence persuaded the court that, although committed mental patients do suffer at least
some impairment of their relationship to reality, most are able to appreciate the benefits,
risks, and discomfort that are associated with psychotropic medication. Okin v. Rogers,
478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361 (D. Mass. 1979).
136. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 496,458 N.E.2d at 313. The court stated that the right to
make treatment decisions is an essential element of the patient's general right "to manage
his affairs." Id. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.lll, § 70E (1983), which enumerates
patients' rights "to refuse to be examined, observed, or treated by students or any other
facility staff without jeopardizing access to psychiatric, psychological, or other medical
care," id. at § 70E(h), and to informed consent to the extent provided by law." Id. at
§ 70E(I).
137. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.201, § 6 (West SUpp. 1983).
138. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
139. Michels, Competence to Refuse Treatment, in REFUSING TREATMENT, supra
note 2, at 115.
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tive capacities to consider the relevant factors; the absence of interfer
ing pathologic or emotional states; their awareness of other views and
attitudes concerning the decision; and an understanding of their rea
sons for deviating from standard views. l40 Massachusetts incompe
tency proceedings focus on whether patients are incapable of taking
care of themselves by reason of mental illness. 141 Under the statutory
proceeding, the court is at liberty to hear medical testimony and to
submit individuals to psychiatric examinations. 142 Thus, the consider
ations deemed relevant to an incompetency finding rely heavily on
medical opinion.
The court in Rogers noted that the incompetency proceeding
under Massachusetts law is the only procedure available for determin
ing that patients lack the capacity to make treatment decisions. 143
Limited by the structure of the certification procedure, the court's
analysis did not address the inadequacies of the present statutory
procedure.
While due process protections are required in determining the
competency issue,'44 no agreement exists as to the necessity or ade
quacy of judicial decisions. One physician has noted that the compe
tency determination requires a subtle assessment of patients' reasons
for refusing medication. 145 Furthermore, the practical meaning of
competency requires clinical rather than legal expertise because it
draws on the values of therapeutic need and relative risk. 146 The exist
ence of conflicts between hospital staffs and patients does indicate the
need for neutral evaluation or an independent decisionmaker.147 A
judge, removed from the clinical mileau, provides a neutral or in
dependent decision, but the decision will not necessarily reflect clinical
expertise or address the needs of the patient.
The use of an independent panel of psychiatrists presents an alter
native to the commonwealth's judicial determination of competence
and would provide neutral decisionmaking and clinical expertise with
out requiring judicial involvement. The district court outlined such a
140. Id. at 117-18.
141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.201, § 6 (West Supp. 1984). See Fazio v. Fazio,
375 Mass. 394, 378 N.E.2d 951 (1978).
142. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.201, § 6 (West Supp. 1983).
143. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 497, 458 N.E.2d at 314, (emphasis added).
144. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. at 1147; Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939,
946 (3d Cir. 1976); Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338, 348-49 (W.D. Mo. 1974). See
also Plotkin, supra note 12, at 491.
145. Bonnie, supra note 3, at 27.
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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procedure with its injunctive order in Rennie v. Klein. 148 The court
ordered the State Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health
to appoint psychiatrists to serve on a panel. 149 The appointed psychia
trists retain their independent status as decisionmakers-that is, they
do not treat the patients who come before the panel for competency
evaluations. 15o The court reasoned that a psychiatrist would be more
effective than a judge, lawyer, or layperson in the independent deci
sionmaker role. 151
The Rennie court's proposal represents a strong argument in
favor of the use of a panel of psychiatrists, thus avoiding the untimely
delays and adversarial nature inherent in the present judicial compe
tency proceeding in Massachusetts. As one attorney recently argued,
the competency hearing is largely duplicative since most involuntarily
committed patients have recently had commitment hearings. 152 Fur
ther, the costs of such hearings will be significant in terms of treatment
staff diverted from the hospital.I 53 More importantly, it remains un
certain whether judicial competency hearings will assure effective pa
tient treatment. 154 Considering crowded court dockets and the
amount of time needed for the process itself-i.e. notice, appointment
of an attorney, hearing time--considerable time will elapse before the
procedure will be completed. During this period, the patient will re
main involuntarily committed without treatment. Such a situation not
only causes administrative problems for the hospital but also allows
patients' health to deteriorate while under the care of the State. 155
462 F. Supp. 1131, 1147-48 (1978).
149. Id. at 1147.
150. Id. at 1148.
151. Id. at 1149. See Corney, Patient's Rights: Too Much Courting, Not Enough
Caring, in REFUSING TREATMENT, supra note 2, at 53. The use of proceedings similar to
administrative hearings is another alternative to judicial incompetency proceedings and
substituted judgment treatment decisions. Rhoden, supra note 37 at 406. An administra
tive officer, rather than a judge, would hold hearings limited to the issue of incompetency to
make treatment decisions. Id. If patients are found incompetent, hearing officers, having
heard evidence on the need for treatment and patients' reasons for refusing treatment,
could then conveniently proceed to make treatment decisions for patients' whose refusals
were found incompetent. Id. Rhoden argued that consistency, knowledgeability, and neu
trality could be assured since an unbiased, expert administrative officer would both assess
incompetency and make treatment decisions. Id. Although such an administrative proce
dure would not burden the state court system as much as the present procedure in Massa
chusetts does, its disadvantages parallel those inherent in formal judicial competency
proceedings; e.g., the adversary nature of the proceedings and their untimeliness.
152. Corney, supra note 151, at 53.
153. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
154. Corney, supra note 151, at 53.
155. See Gill, Side Effects ofa Right to Refuse Treatment Lawsuit; Boston State Hos
pital Experience, in REFUSING TREATMENT, supra note 2, at 84; Nelson, Should There be a
148.
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Many of the arguments proffered by opponents of judicial compe
tency proceedings similarly apply to substituted judgment treatment
decisions required by the Rogers court. Again, the timeliness of the
court process in reaching the substituted treatment decision could re
sult in more unnecessary suffering by the committed patient. 156 An
other argument states that judges simply are not equipped to make
medical treatment decisions and that these decisions are best left to the
physician and family.157 Furthermore, since courts tend to structure
any procedure as an adversary process, a judicial treatment decision
will likely create stress and competition between mental patients and
their doctors, rather than encourage treatment. 15S
The supreme judicial court in Rogers addressed the concern over
time-laden judicial proceedings by creating two exceptions to the re
quirement of judicial approval prior to involuntary treatment. These
exceptions encompassed the "emergency" situation, i.e., when the pa
tient harms, or threatens to harm, himself or others,159 and the situa
tion in which treatment is needed to prevent "immediate, substantial,
and irreversible deterioration of a serious mental illness." 160
The exceptions, however, do not dispel other concerns such as the
adversary nature of judicial proceedings and the inability of judges to
make treatment decisions. Furthermore, the latter exception only
postpones the involvement of the jUdiciary. The "immediate, substan
tial, and irreversible deterioration" exception only provides for interim
treatment without court approval. I61 If the treating doctors feel that
the treatment should continue, and the patient refuses, the doctors
must still seek an adjudication of incompetence and then a substituted
treatment decision by the judge if the patient is found to be
Right to Refuse Treatment?, in REFUSING TREATMENT, supra note 2, at 88. See also Mills
& Gutheil, Legai Approaches to Treating the Treatment-Refusing Patient, in REFUSING
TREATMENT, supra note 2, at 105 (citing Applebaum & Gutheil, The Boston State Case;
"Involuntary Mind Control," The Constitution, and The "Right to Rot," 376 AM. I. PSy
CHIATRY 720-27 (1980)).
156. Rehlman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. I.L. & MED.
233,234 (1978). Contra Brant, Last Rights: An Analysis ofRefusal and Withholding Treat
ment Cases, 46 Mo. L. REV. 337, 361 (1981) (author argued that involvement of the judici
ary in decisions to withhold treatment reflects a recognition that difficult decisions
involving conflicting rights should be made by judges).
157. Rehlman, supra note 156, at 234.
158. Note, supra note 29, at 417. See Parham v. I.R., 442 U.S. 584,610 (1979).
159. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 510,458 N.E.2d at 321. See infra notes 119-21 and ac
companying text.
160. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 511,458 N.E.2d at 322. See infra notes 119-21 and ac
companying text.
161. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 512, 458 N.E.2d at 322. See infra notes 130-33 and ac
companying text.
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incompetent. 162
If granting the right to refuse treatment to involuntarily commit
ted patients had little impact on state hospitals or upon patient treat
ment, then the state procedural guidelines would most likely be
adequate. Physicians argue, however, that the impact will be devastat
ing given that research indicates that more than half of all institution
alized patients are incompetent to make treatment decisions. 163 If this
be SO,I64 treatment will become a nightmarish procedural routine re
quiring constant judicial involvement.
V.

CONCLUSION

The supreme judicial court's decision in Rogers is significant in
that it extended the right to involuntarily committed mental patients
in Massachusetts to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment. Further
more, the opinion provides clear guidance to disability law advocates
concerning the substantive rights of and procedural protections for
mental health patients under state law. More importantly, however,
the decision indicates the need for a legislative re-evaluation of the
statutory law governing incompetency proceedings; specifically,
whether the existing procedures provide the most practical and protec
tive method for making treatment decisions on behalf of those invol
untarily committed patients who refuse treatment. This re-evaluation
is decidedly not the job of the courts. Rather, as Judge Tauro stated
when this case was before the District Court in Massachusetts "if the
statutory scheme is burdensome, redress and relief should be sought
from the legislature."165 Re-evaluation is long past due.
Katherine E. Perrelli

162. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 512,458 N.E.2d at 322.
163. See supra note 5.
164. A great deal of controversy exists concerning the accuracy of such research.
Furthermore, it is still too early to measure the impact on state hospitals as a result of the
Rogers decision. However, the Department of Mental Health estimates that as a result of
the Rogers decision that approximately 1000 cases may need to be brought to court from
the mental retardation facilities and at least an equally large number from mental health
facilities. Memo from Richard Ames, General Counsel for the Department of Mental
Health (Dec. 16, 1983).
165. Okin v. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1363.

